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Abstract—Statistical Ineffective Fault Analysis (SIFA) was
introduced as a new approach to attack block ciphers at CHES
2018. Since then, they have been proven to be a powerful
class of attacks, with an easy to achieve fault model. One of
the main benefits of SIFA is to overcome detection-based and
infection-based countermeasures. In this paper we explain how
the principles of SIFA can be applied to GIMLI, an authenticated
encryption cipher participating the NIST-LWC competition. We
identified two possible rounds during the intialization phase of
GIMLI to mount our attack. If we attack the first location we
are able to recover 3 bits of the key uniquely and the parity of
8 key-bits organized in 3 sums using 180 ineffective faults per
biased single intermediate bit. If we attack the second location
we are able to recover 15 bits of the key uniquely and the parity
of 22 key-bits organized in 7 sums using 340 ineffective faults
per biased intermediate bit. Furthermore, we investigated the
influence of the fault model on the rate of ineffective faults in
GIMLI. Finally, we verify the efficiency of our attacks by means
of simulation.
Index Terms—Fault Attack, Statistical Ineffective Fault Anal-
ysis, SIFA, GIMLI, Authentificated Encryption, NIST
I. INTRODUCTION
Fault attacks span a class of implementation level attack which
were first introduced by Boneh et al. in their seminal work [2].
Fault attacks pose a serious threat to the implementation of
cryptographic algorithms. They usually aim for a modification
of the processed data or the control flow in order to reduce the
underlying mathematical problem to a simpler one. The most
common type of fault attack is the Differential Fault Analysis
(DFA) which requires knowledge of multiple faulted encryp-
tions and a correct one. Statistical Ineffective Fault Analysis
(SIFA), as introduced by Dobraunig et al. [6], requires only an
intermediate state with a biased distribution i.e. a distribution
which deviates from the uniform distribution. Also, in contrast
to Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) it is not necessary to have
tuples of faulty and correct encryptions. Even worse, SIFA
can break traditional countermeasures against fault attacks like
detection-based or infection-based countermeasures.
State of the art: So far the priciples of SIFA were applied
to a variety of cryptographic algorithms ranging from block
ciphers as AES [6] to authentificated encryption schemes like
KETJE, KEYAK [5] and ASCON [11].
Contributions: We present the first SIFA on the NIST-LWC-
candidate GIMLI. Additionally, we verify the efficiency of our
attacks by means of simulation. In addition, we evaluate the
influence of the fault model on the rate of ineffective faults.
Organization: The rest of the work is structured as fol-
lows: Section II introduces authenticated encryption and the
NIST-LWC competition. Section III explains the principles of
SIFA. Section IV presents the NIST-LWC candidate GIMLI.
Section V introduces our SIFA on GIMLI. Section VI provides
the results of our proposed attack on GIMLI.
II. NIST LIGHTWEIGHT CRYPTOGRAPHY
With the growing amount of interconnected devices, the need
for secure communications is ubiquitous. While today’s cryp-
tographic algorithms are well suited for high-end computing,
like servers, or desktops, their performance degenerates dra-
matically, when implemented on small, resource-constrained
devices. Therefore, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) launched an open standardization project
for lightweight cryptography in 2013 [8]. In 2019, the tremen-
dous amount of 57 round 1 submissions confirms the need and
interest of lightweight cryptography. NIST focuses on small,
but secure algorithms that provide both Authenticated En-
cryption with Associated Data (AEAD) and Hash. Additional
features like post-quantum resistance or ease of side-channel
and fault-attack resistant implementations are desirable, but
not mandatory. In this paper, we will focus on AEAD: Au-
thenticated Encryption (AE) combines the traditionally sep-
arated cryptographic primitives symmetric key cryptography
and authentication into one single algorithm. Additionally,
in AEAD, Associated Data (AD) is authenticated, but not
encrypted. This is particular useful for header information in
a communication protocol that must be authenticated, but do
not need to be encrypted. If the authentication of either the
AD or message fails, an empty string is output, otherwise the
plaintext is released. This prevents chosen ciphertext attacks.
Fig. 1 shows the inputs and outputs of an AEAD scheme
(encryption). Formally, let k, ν, t ≥ 1, K ∈ {0, 1}k denote
a secret key, N ∈ {0, 1}ν a nonce, AD ∈ {0, 1}∗ associated
data, M ∈ {0, 1}∗ a message, T ∈ {0, 1}t an authentication
tag, and C ∈ {0, 1}∗ a ciphertext. An AEAD is a triple
Π = (K, E ,D), with a key-generation procedure K that returns
a random K, an encryption algorithm EK(N,AD,M), and a
decryption algorithm DK(N,AD,C, T ), where E outputs a
pair (C, T ), and D outputs either the plaintext M or the void
symbol ⊥ if the tag is invalid:
E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}ν × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}t
D :{0, 1}k×{0, 1}ν ×{0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗×{0, 1}t→ {0, 1}∗ ∪{⊥}
M AD
NK E
C T
Figure 1: AEAD Encryption
III. SIFA
The exploitation of statistical ineffective faults was first pro-
posed by Dobraunig et al., in order to break symmetric
cryptography [6]. SIFA can be seen as the combination of
Ineffective Fault Analysis (IFA), as proposed by Clavier and
Christophe [3], and Statistical Fault Analysis (SFA) as pro-
posed by Fuhr et al. [7]. In the following, the principles of
SIFA are explained.
A. Background
SIFA combines the benefits of IFA and SFA in terms of the
required fault model, the key distinguisher and the ability of
overcoming countermeasures: The required fault model of IFA,
is rather specific e.g. Clavier et al. proposed a fault model
where the computation of an XOR results always in a zero
value [3]. The downside of the assumed fault model is the
fact that the required fault model is difficult to achieve in
practice. In contrast, the assumptions of the required fault
model for a SFA are loose as the only requirement for
a successful SFA is a biased intermediate state as shown
by Fuhr et al. [7]. Both attacks differ significantly in how
they recover the key: In IFA the recovery of the correct
target partial sub key is strictly analytical; whereas in SFA
a statistical approach is used. One of the main benefits of the
statistical approach, in SFA, is the immunity to noisy faults i.e.
injections that do not comply with the required fault model.
The main benefit of ineffective faults is the ability to break
common countermeasures against fault attacks. There are two
possible countermeasures against fault attacks: detection-based
countermeasures and infection-based countermeasures [6]. The
most common form of detection-based countermeasures is
temporal redundancy, where an encryption or decryption is
performed twice. If the results do not match, a fault occurred
and appropriate measures like a system-reset can be taken. The
infection-based countermeasure applies additional operations
in order to increase the fault propagation to an level where
an attack is no longer feasible [9, 13]. IFA is based on a
very precise fault model where a faulted operation always
returns the same value in the general case. By forcing the
output of an operation to a specific value, the attacker can
distinguish, if the output of the faulty operation is equal to
the fault free output. If the faulted output equals the fault free
output, an ineffective fault occurred. Fig. 2-IFA shows this
behavior, where the computation of an XOR always returns
IFA
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Figure 2: SIFA Background
zero as in [3]. IFA is feasible even if the previously introduced
countermeasures are implemented because the output of the
cryptographic operation is correct. In contrast to IFA, SFA
exploits the non-uniform distribution of intermediate values in
conjunction with the corresponding faulty output to recover the
secret key. As shown in Fig. 2-SFA an attacker injects a fault
after the computation of f1 and before f2, where fi | i ∈ {1, 2}
denotes parts of the cryptographic operation. The intermediate
state becomes therefore fautly and follows a biased distribution
which enables a SFA. The attack partially decrypts the faulty
ciphertext with a hypothesis of the target partial subkey in
order to calculate the faulty (biased) intermediate value. By
repeating this for all key-hypotheses and ranking the corre-
sponding intermediate values according to their deviation from
the uniform distribution. When SIFA is applied, an attacker
can determine the correct key by introducing ineffective faults.
However, in contrast to IFA the fault model does not need to
be known exactly. It is sufficient to bias an intermediate value.
Furthermore, the cipher-output needed for the attack is correct
in contrast to SFA.
B. Foundations of Statistical Ineffective Fault Analysis
SIFA evaluates the statistical distribution of intermediate val-
ues and identifies appropriate key candidates with a statistical
model.
Distribution of Intermediate values: We assume that a fault
only corrupts a part s of the intermediate state. The partial
intermediate state after a fault injection is denoted by s′. The
alternation of s→ s′ | s 6= s′ results in a faulty computation
and will affect the outcome of the cryptographic algorithm.
However, an alternation s → s′ | s′ = s does not affect the
outcome of the cryptographic algorithm. From now on we will
refer to such a behavior as an ineffective fault.
Such ineffective faults can be exploited, if they cause a
biased distribution in the intermediate value. The six Fault
Distribution Tables (FDTs) in Table 1 show the transition
probability of two-bit intermediate values for six typical fault
models. In order to apply SIFA, the diagonal of such a table
(marked in blue) must differ from the uniform distribution.
This holds true for Tables 1a to 1d. The table’s entries which
are not colored blue denote the probability of effective faults.
(a) Random-Or
s′
00 01 10 11
s
00 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
01 0 1
2
0 1
2
10 0 0 1
2
1
2
11 0 0 0 1
(b) Random-And
s′
00 01 10 11
s
00 1 0 0 0
01 1
2
1
2
0 0
10 1
2
0 1
2
0
11 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
(c) Stuck-at-0
s′
00 01 10 11
s
00 1 0 0 0
01 1 0 0 0
10 1 0 0 0
11 1 0 0 0
(d) Probabilistic bit-flip
s′
00 01 10 11
s
00 4
9
2
9
2
9
1
9
01 4
9
2
9
2
9
1
9
10 4
9
2
9
2
9
1
9
11 4
9
2
9
2
9
1
9
(e) Random fault
s′
00 01 10 11
s
00 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
01 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
10 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
11 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
(f) Bit-flip
s′
00 01 10 11
s
00 0 0 0 1
01 0 0 1 0
10 0 1 0 0
11 1 0 0 0
Table 1: FDTs of 2-bit variables
Statistical model: By injecting a fault in an operation an
intermediate value of n-bit is affected. The intermediate value
is represented by the two random variables S and S′, before
and after the injected fault. This means the intermediate value
is denoted by the random variable S when no faults are
present and S′ otherwise. Both random variable can take
values s ∈ S = {0, ..., 2n − 1}. The probabilities of the
individual entries of the FDT are calculated as shown in
Eq. (1), where s corresponds to the values in the rows and
s′ to the values in the columns of Table 1.
ps(s
′) := P (S′ = s′ | S = s). (1)
The elements of the diagonal of an FDT correspond to the
probabilities for different ineffective faults as shown in Eq. (2).
ps′(s
′) := P (S′ = s′ | S = s′). (2)
We assume the FDT is not known to the attacker. Nevertheless,
it is still possible to exploit the diagonal’s deviation from
the uniform distribution. Since we assume the presence of
a detection-based countermeasure, or an authenticated de-
cryption like GIMLI-decrypt (which inherently provides the
required filtering), we will state the statistical model explicitly
for this scenario. Here, the attacker has only access to samples
where the intermediate values under attack fulfill S = S′.
Under the assumption, that S is uniformly distributed with
P(S = s) = 2−n = 1|S| , the rate of ineffective faults rineff can
be calculated as shown in Eq. (3).
rineff = P (S
′ = S) =
∑
s′ ∈ S
ps′(s
′)
|S| (3)
The diagonal of the FDT can be expressed as conditional
distribution as shown in Eq. (4). This distribution is later
estimated by an attacker, as neither the diagonal nor S′ can
be observed.
pineff(s
′) = P (S′ = s′ | S′ = S) = ps′(s
′)
|S| · rineff (4)
However, it is possible to calculate the hypothetical dis-
tribution pH of S′H under the assumption of a fixed key
hypothesis kH . By using the correct key guess kH the correct
distribution pineff(s′) = pH=correct(s′) is observed. In order to
distinguish it from incorrect key guesses, we assume that all
distributions of incorrect key hypotheses kH=wrong are close
to the uniform distribution i.e. pH=wrong(s′) ≈ θ(s′) = 2−n.
The distinguisher D(pH) is used to rank the key candidates
according to their distance to θ(s′). The chi-squared (χ2) test
as introduced by Pearson [10], is used to calculate a metric for
the difference of two probability distribution function a and b,
both with values x ∈ X and N samples as shown in Eq. (5)
χ2(a, b) = N
∑
x∈X
a(x)− b(x)
b(x)
. (5)
Since incorrect key guesses follow the uniform distribution,
we can use the χ2 metric to distinguish distributions resulting
from the correct key hypothesis pH=correct and a uniform
distribution θ caused by an incorrect hypothesis. This leads
to the χ2-distinguisher as shown in Eq. (6).
D(pHi) = CHI(pHi) := χ
2(pHi , θ) (6)
Alternatively, a scaled version of CHI, the Squared Euclidean
Imbalance (SEI) [12] as shown in Eq. (7), can be used.
D(pHi) = SEI(pHi) =
1
|S| ·N · CHI(pHi) (7)
Where N denotes the number of observed decryptions under
the influence of ineffective faults.
IV. GIMLI
GIMLI is a suite of cryptographic primitives based on the
GIMLI-permutation by Bernstein et al. [1]. It participates in
the NIST lightweight cryptographic project for authenticated
encryption and hash. In this paper, we focus on the GIMLI-
CIPHER, a family for Authenticated Encryption with Associ-
ated Data (AEAD).
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Figure 3: Sponge construction of GIMLI
A. The Gimli-permutation
The GIMLI-permutation is based on an a 384-bit-state. As
shown in Eq. (8), the state is defined as a 3×4 matrix: the rows
are named a, b, c; the columns are enumerated 0, 1, 2, 3; the
round is denoted by r. For example a111 denotes to the second
32 bit word before the execution of the 11 round.
State :=

ar0 a
r
1 a
r
2 a
r
3
br0 b
r
1 b
r
2 b
r
3
cr0 c
r
1 c
r
2 c
r
3
 (8)
Algorithm 1 describes how this state is permuted in 24
consecutive rounds. They are enumerated in reverse order:
a permutation starts with round 24 and ends with round 1.
During each round, the state is first substituted and permuted
(SP-Box). Every second round, the state is mixed linearly
(alternating either a small swap or a big swap). Finally, every
fourth round, a constant is added.
Algorithm 1 The GIMLI-permutation
function PERMUTE(a, b, c) . Input State
for r = 24 downto 1 do
for j = 0 to 3 do
ta ← aj <<< 24 . SP-Box
tb ← bj <<< 9
tc ← cj
aj ← tc ⊕ tb ⊕ ((ta & tb) 3)
bj ← ta ⊕ tb ⊕ ((ta | tc) 1)
cj ← ta ⊕ (tc  1)⊕ ((tb & tc) 3)
end for
if r mod 4 = 0 then
a0||a1||a2||a3 ← a1||a0||a3||a2 . Small Swap
else if r mod 4 = 2 then
a0||a1||a2||a3 ← a2||a3||a0||a1 . Big Swap
end if
if r mod 4 = 0 then
a0 ← a0 ⊕ 0x9e377900⊕ r . Constant Addition
end if
end for
return (a, b, c) . Output State
end function
B. The Gimli-AEAD
The GIMLI-CIPHER is a sponge based AEAD scheme with a
128 bit rate and a 256 bit capacity. The rate matches a, the
capacity matches the concatenation of b and c. Fig. 3 depicts
the four phase during an AEAD. As the exploited fault is
ineffective in respect to the output, the exact behavior of the
AEAD scheme is secondary and a brief description of the four
phases is sufficient: First, the state is initialized with a 128 bit
nonce, and the 256 bit key as depicted in Eq. (9).
Nonce: a240 ... a
24
3 ← n0 n1 n2 n3
Key: b240 ... b
24
3 ||c240 ... c243 ← k0 k1 ... k7
(9)
Second, the associated data ADi are absorbed in blocks of
128 bit. Subsequently, the message block key si is squeezed.
Depending on the mode, either the ciphertext Ci = Mi ⊕ si
or the plaintext Mi = Ci ⊕ si is generated. In any case, next,
the plaintext Mi is absorbed. Finally, the tag is calculated. Be-
tween all phases and absorbed blocks the GIMLI-permutation
is invoked. Incomplete blocks are padded. Additionally, there
is a domain separation between the processing of AD, the
processing of plaintext, and finalization. For decryption, the
tag is not output, but compared to the received tag. If both tags
match, the plaintext is released, otherwise, the empty string is
output.
V. SIFA ON GIMLI
We target the decryption of GIMLI because AEAD schemes
only release the plaintext if the computed tag matches the
original tag. This behavior can be exploited to distinguish
between effective and ineffective faults, as an effective fault
results in a tag mismatch.
A. Fault Injection Location
For the SIFA on GIMLI we evaluated different locations
where an induced ineffective fault can be exploited. Similar
to the attacks on Ketje and Keyak [5], we use the nonce
and a hypothesis of the target partial subkey kH to calculate
an intermediate value of GIMLI. In general, this is possible
for any intermediate value during the decryption of GIMLI.
However, in order to reduce the number of involved key-
bits of the intermediate value and the number of hypotheses
NH , it is desirable to attack the early rounds of the first
GIMLI-permutation. Fig. 4 shows an attack mounted during
the initialization phase. When we target the first GIMLI-
permutation, we can choose from one of the 24 rounds.
The Substitution Permutation Box (SP-Box) of the GIMLI-
permutation poses the best attack target, due to the involved
non-linearity. A possible position to inject an ineffective fault
into the SP-Box is colored red in Fig. 5. We mount the attack
on a biased br, however a similar reasoning can be applied for
a biased ar or cr. The attacked round is a trade-off between the
number of recoverable key-bits nkeybits and number of possible
key hypotheses NH . The earlier the attack, the simpler are
the equations for the intermediate values, but also fewer key
bits can be revealed. The later the attack, the higher is the
number of involved key bits nkeybits and thus, more hypotheses
NH must be checked. The number of hypotheses NH grows
exponentially with the number of involved key bits nkeybits as
shown in Eq. (10).
NH ∼ 2nkeybits (10)
In order to determine the exact number of involved key bits
bk the dependencies of an intermediate value must be traced
back to the initialization phase where the state gets initialized
using the known nonce and the unknown key.
B. Calculation of Intermediate Values
The dependencies of an intermediate value under attack are
related to the fault injection location. We will demonstrate an
attack of bit br0,7. Hereby b
r
0,7 denotes the seventh bit of the
word b220 during round r. The resulting dependencies of b
r
0,7
with respect to the according injection location are shown in
the second row of Table 2. A fault injection in the very first
r nkeybits Dependencies of br0,7
23 2 k0,31 ⊕ n0,15 ⊕ (n0,14 | k4,6)
k0,21 ⊕ n0,6 ⊕ (n0,5 | k4,29)⊕ k5,15 ⊕ k1,6⊕
22 11 ⊕(n1,20 & k1,3)⊕ c15 ⊕ [(k5,14 ⊕ k1,5 ⊕ (n1,19 &
& k1,2)⊕ c14) | (n0,14 ⊕ k4,5 ⊕ (k4,4 & k0,27))]
21 37 cf. Appendix
Table 2: Dependencies of br0,7 for different injection locations
round, i.e. after round 24, to attack the bit b230,7 only affects
two key bits and therefore, does not offer a big advantage
in terms of recoverable key bit this is shown in the first row
of Table 2. If the fault is injected one round later i.e. after
round 23, eleven key bits are involved in the computation of
the bit b220,7 this is shown in the second row of Table 2. By
biasing the intermediate bit b210,7 again a round later, an attacker
can utilize 37 involved key-bits due to the sheer length of the
involved equations we stated the full dependency equation in
the Appendix. Involved key-bits lead to a dependency due to
the path along which they properagate through the GIMLI-
permutation. The bit wise dependencies after each GIMLI-
round are visualized similarly to Dobraunig et al. [4]. Involved
bits i.e. dependencies are represented by a 1 independent bits
are represented by ’0’ or ’-’ e.g. c=1100 means that only
bit 3 and 2 of this nibble are involved in a computation.
The position of the key is colored in green and the nonce in
blue. Fig. 6 shows, which bits are involved in the computation
of the intermediate bit b220,7 which is colored in red. Even
though 11 bits of the key are involved in the calculation of
the intermediate value b220,7, not all of them can be identified
distinctively due to linear dependencies of the involved key
bits. Eq. (11) shows these linear dependencies. Each of the
three sums are affected by three different key bits. Therefore,
only the sums ks1, ks2 and ks3, but not the individual key bits
can be recovered.
ks1 = k0,21 ⊕ k5,15 ⊕ k1,6
ks2 = k5,14 ⊕ k1,5
ks3 = k4,5 ⊕ (k4,4 & k0,27)
(11)
Thus, an attack on the intermediate value b220,7 reveals only the
key bits k4,29, k1,3 and k1,2. However, the key sums can also
be used to build hypotheses. This results in an advantage of 26
compared to brute-forcing each individual bit of the involved
key bits. An attack on the intermediate state b210,7 already
involves 37 key bits. Taking linear dependencies into account,
the number of hypotheses is 222. A graphical representation
of the dependencies of b210,7 is shown in Fig. 7 Going one
round further (br=200,7 ) increase the number of involved key
bits to 168. However, testing 2168 hypotheses is not feasible
in a reasonable amount of time. Thus, the attack on the
intermediate states in rounds 22 and 21 offer a reasonable
trade-off between the number of hypotheses and recoverable
key bits.
C. Fault Model
In Section III the influence of some typical fault models onto
the FDT’s was shown in Table 1 at the example of a two bit
intermediate state. However, the fault models are not limited
to 2-bit but can be applied to words with variable width w.
Since we cannot choose the word-width of the implementation
of GIMLI but still want to evaluate the distribution of a single
bit, it is important to evaluate, if a byte based fault model also
biases each bit separately. For example a fault of width w = 8
is the equivalent to a byte based fault model. We simulated
faults with w = 8 according to the probabilistic bit flip fault
model where a flip from 1 → 0 occurs with probability
P1→0 = 23 and a flip 0 → 1 with probability P0→1 = 13 .
This biased bit flip probabilities for a one bit intermediate
value b result in the histogram shown in Fig. 8 This behavior
is the same as the FDT shown in Table 1d which depicts
the two dimensional case. The bias of the 8-bit intermediate
value br=220,0−7 caused by an ineffective fault is shown in Fig. 9.
The nearly normal distributed values without any fault are
colored in green whereas all values leading to ineffective faults
are colored in blue. If one compares the histogram as shown
E
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Figure 4: Fault Injection Location GIMLI
ar br cr
<<< 24 <<< 9
 1
&
 2
≥ 1
 1
&
 3
+ +E +
cr−1 br−1 → biased ar−1
b′i = bi
Figure 5: Fault Injection Location SP-Box
ar=24 ---- 4-6- --18 ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
br=24 -82- ---- ---- --6c ---- ---- ---- ----
cr=24 2--- --3- ---- c--- ---- ---- ---- ----
ar=23 ---- c --- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
br=23 4 --- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
cr=23 ---- -- 4 - ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
ar=22 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
br=22 ---- -- 8 - ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
cr=22 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
...
Round 23
Round 24 (+ Small Swap)
Figure 6: Dependencies of br=220,7
in Fig. 9 with the previously introduced FDTs as shown in
Table 1, it becomes clear that this distribution can be attacked
due to the deviation from the uniform distribution which is
directly recognizable. Based on the simulations as shown in
Fig. 9 we decided to use a byte based fault model i.e. w = 8
during the explanation of the attack strategy.
D. Attack Strategy
For the attack it is necessary to generate decryptions under
the influence of an ineffective fault. As a result of GIMLI
being a AEAD scheme the collected decryptions are all under
the influence of an ineffective fault otherwise there would be
ar=24 3-c- 7e2c -3-8 -c-- ---- ---- ---- ----
br=24 36-4 1-18 36-- -da4 ---- ---- ---- ----
cr=24 1c1- 7-3e ---8 4-6- ---- ---- ---- ----
ar=23 -- 18 4 - 6 - ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
br=23 - 82 - -- 6c ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
cr=23 2 --- c - 3 - ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
ar=22 ---- c --- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
br=22 4 --- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
cr=22 ---- -- 4 - ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
ar=21 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
br=21 ---- -- 8 - ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
cr=21 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
...
Round 22 (+ Big Swap)
Round 23
Round 24 (+ Small Swap)
Figure 7: Dependencies of br=210,7
no output due to a tag mismatch. After a sufficient number
of decryptions Nd is obtained we calculate the hypothetical
intermediate bit inter. The calculation of the intermediate bit
is done with respect to the possible key hypotheses and all
obtained nonces n. The distribution of inter is then ranked by
according to the SEI. Now that each hypothetical distribution
has been assigned an SEI, the correct key hypothesis can be
identified as the one with the largest SEI. The algorithmic
representation of the attack is shown in Algorithm 2. First
the hypothetical intermediate values are calculated for all
possible keys. Then for each key hypothesis the SEI of the
intermediate distribution is calculated and stored. If a new
SEI is greater than or equal to the old one the corresponding
key hypothesis is used as the new correct hypothesis. After
all hypotheses have been processed, the algorithm terminates.
In our attack strategy, it is necessary to choose an appropriate
intermediate value to attack as the involved key bits which can
be recovered for each intermediate value differ. As introduced
in Section V-B, it is possible to calculate some key bits directly
and some key bits only in the form of a sum. The computation
of the intermediate state b220,7 involves 11 key bits as shown
in the dependency equations in Table 2. However, 8 key bits
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Figure 9: Histogram of intermediate values br=220,0−7
influence b220,7 only in the form of a sum as shown in Eq. (11).
The computation of br=220,7 involves nkeybits = 11 but only
hypotheses on 6 key bits are required as the remaining key
bits only appear in the form of a sum. Therefore, the number
of hypotheses NH shrinks from 211 to 26. The same effect
also occurs when we target the intermediate value at the same
position one round later i.e. br=210,7 . The computation of the
intermediate state b210,7 involves 37 key bits as shown in the
dependency equations in Table 2. The key-bits k4,26, k4,20,
k4,5, k4,4, k4,3, k4,2, k4,1, k1,26, k1,25, k1,8, k1,7, k1,2, k0,26,
k0,25 and k0,18 can be determined uniquely. Furthermore, the
sum of 22 key bits in the form of 7 sum can be determined.
From the 37 involved key bits we are able to obtain an
advantage of 22 bits compared to the brute force effort over
Algorithm 2 SIFA on GIMLI
NH ← 2nkeybits
n[Nd]← loadNonces()
maxSEI ← 0
corrHypo ← 0
for i = 0 to NH do
for j = 0 to Nd do
inter[i][j]← calcIntermediateBit(i, n[j])
end for
SEI[i]← calcSEI(inter[i][∗])
if SEI[i] ≥ maxSEI then
maxSEI ← SEI[i]
corrHypo ← i
end if
end for
return corrHypo
all involved key bits. Due to some ambiguity in the large
equation for br=210,7 the SIFA reveals three candidates with
the same SEI after 340 decryptions under the influence of
ineffective faults. The ambiguity is caused by some nonce
bits that do not differ when they cause an ineffective fault.
Although the described ambiguity is present, there is always
the correct key-hypothesis among those three candidates. By
the injection of 8-bit ineffective fault, hypotheses can be build
on 8 intermediate bits that can be evaluated simultaneously
with almost no extra computational effort. With this we get
an advantage of at most 8 · 6 = 48 bits when attacking round
22 and at most 8 · 22 = 176 bits when attacking round 21.
In order to obtain the complete key which is loaded during
the initialization phase of GIMLI it is necessary to repeat the
proposed attacks with varying intermediate states under attack
until all key bits are recovered.
VI. RESULTS
Now that we have clarified the prerequisites for the attack, we
will present the results. First we will evaluate the influence of
the fault width w on the ineffectiveness rate of the injected
faults. Second the obtained results for the attack on br=220,7
and br=210,7 are presented. Both attacks exploit the bias of an
ineffective fault with fault width w = 8 bit injected after round
23 respectively 22 under the assumption of a probabilistic bit
flip fault model.
A. Influence of fault width on ineffectiveness rate
SIFA exploits the bias present in an intermediate state in-
dependently of the assumed fault model. In practice, it is
usually assumed that an attacker has no information about
the FDT which is caused by the ineffective fault injection.
Nevertheless, the only prerequisite for a successful attack is
that an intermediate value follows a biased distribution. The
biased distribution is indicated by the diagonal of the FDT
which follows a non-uniform distribution as shown in Table 1.
Furthermore, we typically cannot choose the target architecture
where GIMLI-AEAD is run on, which can either be a software
implementation running on a microcontroller or a hardware
implementation running on a FPGA or ASIC. If we consider
the case of a software implementation of GIMLI-AEAD, then
the fault width w will be the same as the word with of the
micro-controller. If we consider a hardware implementation
of GIMLI-AEAD the fault width w is usually dependent
of the implementation. In the following we use the typical
fault models random-And, Stuck-at-0 and probabilistic bit-flip
exemplary to simulate a fault on a software implementation,
the same reasoning can also be applied to hardware implemen-
tations. Faults are injected during round 23 of the first GIMLI-
permutation on state br=220 . The width w of the fault ranges
from 1 to 32 bit with w ∈ {1, 4, 8, 16, 32}. By calculating
the number of ineffective faults nineff divided by the number
of total encryptions N we obtain the ineffectiveness rate as
shown in Eq. (12).
rineff =
nineff
N
. (12)
The ineffectiveness rate rineff with respect to the fault width
w is shown in Fig. 10. As one can see the ineffectiveness
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Figure 10: Ineffectiveness rate rineff of different fault models
rate rineff decreases almost linearly with the assumed fault
width w. The linear decrease of the ineffectiveness rate occurs
independently of the three fault models. The ineffectiveness
rate of the probabilistic bit flip fault model is dependent on
the assumed bit flip probabilities we decided to use this model
to provide a worst case estimation. In practice this means that
attacking a 32-bit software implementation of GIMLI, should
be feasible according to Fig. 10. Especially the Random-
And model offers a significant rate of ineffective faults at
w = 32 bit. However, due to the very low ineffectiveness
rate for the other fault models, a number of more than 109
total encryptions is required for the attack. For the sake of
simplicity further simulations where done with a fault width
w = 8 bit in order to minimize the computational effort of
generating ineffective faults.
B. Attack on br=220,7
The attack on the intermediate state br=220,7 is able to retrieve
the involved key bits correctly after approximately 180 inef-
fective faults. The number of required encryptions under the
influence of an ineffective fault is shown in Fig. 12 where
we used the SEI as statistical metric. In Fig. 12 the best
wrong hpyothesis is colored red and the correct hypothesis
in blue. Furthermore, it is important to notice, that after the
point both are crossing line, the correct hypothesis keeps a
significantly higher value. Fig. 11 shows the advantage over
brute forcing when increasing the number of decryptions with
ineffective faults. The maximum advantage is defined as the
number of unique definable parameters when attacking the
single bit br=220,7 , i.e. the three key-bits and the three sum-
values therefore the maximal advantage of the attack on round
21 can be 6 bit. The unstable advantage at the beginning is
caused by multiple key hypotheses with similar SEI values,
which leads to frequent change of the key hypothesis having
the current maximum SEI. Although the correct key hypothesis
is retrieved after 180 ineffective faults, some bits of a wrong
hypothesis still are equal to the corresponding bits in the
correct guess leading to an advantage of less than 6 bits.
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C. Attack on br=210,7
The attack on the intermediate state br=210,7 is able to retrieve the
involved key bits correctly after approximately 340 ineffective
faults. Again, the number of required encryptions under the
influence of an ineffective fault is shown in Fig. 14 where
we used the SEI as statistical metric. In Fig. 14 the best
wrong hpyothesis is colored red and the correct hypothesis
in blue. Fig. 13 shows the advantage over brute forcing when
increasing the number of decryptions with ineffective faults.
The possible advantage when attacking br=210,7 is 22-bits at max.
Although the hypothesis with highest SEI changes frequently
when using less than 340 ineffective faults, the correct key-
guess has the maximal SEI after obtaining it.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we presented the SIFA of the AEAD scheme
GIMLI (GIMLI-24-CIPHER). Furthermore, we investigated the
influence of the fault width w on the rate of ineffective faults
rineff. The fact that SIFA can be applied to the AEAD scheme
GIMLI should be considered a threat. This is mainly due to
the fact that the fault model assumed by SIFA is rather simple
to achieve i.e. a biased intermediate value which is processed
during a cryptographic operation. Due to the ineffective char-
acteristic common countermeasures against fault attacks can
be circumvented by SIFA.
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APPENDIX
A. Dependency br=210,7 - round 22
br=210,7 = b
r=22
0,30 ⊕ ar=220,15 ⊕ (ar=220,14 | cr=220,6 ).
B. Dependency br=210,7 - round 23
br=220,30 = b
r=23
0,21 ⊕ ar=230,15 ⊕ (ar=230,5 | cr=230,29 )
ar=220,15 = c
r=23
0,15 ⊕ br=230,6 ⊕ (ar=230,20 & br=230,3 )
ar=220,14 = c
r=23
0,14 ⊕ br=230,5 ⊕ (ar=230,19 & br=230,2 )
cr=220,6 = a
r=23
0,14 ⊕ cr=230,5 ⊕ (cr=230,4 & br=230,27 )
C. Dependency br=210,7 - input
br=230,21 = k0,12 ⊕ n0,29 ⊕ (n0,28 | k4,20)
ar=230,6 = k5,6 ⊕ k1,29 ⊕ (n1,11 & k1,26)⊕ c6
ar=230,5 = k5,5 ⊕ k1,28 ⊕ (n1,10 & k1,25)⊕ c5
cr=230,29 = n0,5 ⊕ k4,28 ⊕ (k4,27 & k0,18)
cr=230,15 = n0,23 ⊕ k4,14 ⊕ (k4,13 & k0,4)
br=230,06 = k0,29 ⊕ n0,14 ⊕ (n0,13 | k4,5)
ar=230,20 = k5,20 ⊕ k1,11 ⊕ (n1,25 & k1,8)⊕ c20
br=230,03 = k0,26 ⊕ n0,11 ⊕ (n0,10 | k4,2)
cr=230,14 = n0,22 ⊕ k4,13 ⊕ (k4,12 & k0,3)
br=230,05 = k0,28 ⊕ n0,13 ⊕ (n0,12 | k4,4)
ar=230,19 = k5,19 ⊕ k1,10 ⊕ (n1,24 & k1,7)⊕ c19
br=230,2 = k0,25 ⊕ n0,10 ⊕ (n0,9 | k4,1)
ar=230,14 = k5,14 ⊕ k1,5 ⊕ (n1,19 & k1,2)⊕ c14;
cr=230,05 = n0,13 ⊕ k4,4 ⊕ (k4,3 & k0,26)
cr=230,04 = n0,12 ⊕ k4,3 ⊕ (k4,2 & k0,25)
br=230,27 = k0,18 ⊕ n0,3 ⊕ (n0,2 | k4,26)
D. br=210,7 - key sums
Key bits which can only recovered in the form of a sum are
colored in blue.
